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2.7 SPATIAL INEQUALITIES OF PUBLIC WORKS 
EMPLOYMENT
Márton Czirfusz
This chapter deals with the spatial inequalities of the public works scheme. 
The main question to be answered concerns which types of unevenness are 
present at the sub-national scale if we look at access to the programme and 
the distribution practices of quotas and funding.
Local or regional inequalities of the labour market and effects of labour 
policies have been covered in some of the former yearbooks of The Hungarian 
labour market and also the In focus sections of those (see for example Kabai–
Németh, 2012, Kertesi–Kézdi, 2010, Lőcsei, 2011). These studies have made 
clear that spatiality is a crucial aspect if analysing the realm of labour. How-
ever, spatiality as such is not only a dimension of labour (or in the case of this 
yearbook, of the public works scheme) to be taken into account. Space (i.e. 
the fact that social relations are distributed over space) is constitutive of the 
public work scheme: the public works scheme is distributed geographically 
unevenly, and thereby public works as a social relation reproduces geographi-
cally uneven development. Spatial patterns to be discussed in this chapter are 
not a result of purely spatial causes; spatial forms have to be understood as 
a result of social relations occurring over space, as a result of the geographi-
cally uneven historical development of capitalism (see for example Massey, 
1995). From this perspective, local variations of the public works scheme are 
not only ‘local specificities’ in-line with or diverging from processes at the 
national scale; the national level picture shown in other chapters of In focus 
are constituted exactly of these local processes.
This chapter is structured as follows. The first part is a literature review on 
how the public works scheme, and workfare in general reproduces socio-spa-
tial inequalities. Secondly, data used for describing the spatial inequalities 
of the Hungarian public works scheme is discussed. The third part covers a 
description of spatial inequalities of the public works scheme, the main ar-
gument being that the programme funds are distributed unevenly not only 
socially, but also spatially.
Public works as spatial policy
At times of economic crises society reacts to the growing unemployment and 
the worsening of life conditions in different ways. On the one hand social 
movements (such as trade unions or other representations of class interests) 
call for direct job-creation by the (national) state. On the other hand, the 
state itself (mediating between economic processes and prevailing ideologies 
Márton czirfusz: spatial inequalities...
129
of the political elites) also considers direct job-creation as an effective means 
of tackling the devastating effects of economic crises (cf. Arrighi, 1990, Silver, 
2003). In other words, following Polanyi’s (2001) idea of the ‘double move-
ment’, in times when the self-regulating market fails (such as recently, during 
and after the 2008 crisis), social dislocations ‘naturally’ lead to social protec-
tionism and different forms of political intervention.
In Hungary, these historical processes unfolded in a very similar way as in 
core countries of the world-system, following the waves of global capitalist de-
velopment. During the downturn of the 1870s some suggested that the state 
should play a more active role in job-creation, but this idea was easily fobbed 
off in the heyday of economic liberalism (cf. Rézler, 2001). During the 1929–
33 Great Depression, the government (both at the national, as well as on the 
municipal level) attempted to create jobs in public works programmes (Baksay, 
1987), the 1930s also featured government policies offering social assistance 
only for those taking part in public works. Following the crisis of the 1970s 
the government put forward a rapid restructuring of the manufacturing in-
dustry and a raising of the standard of living, but controversial labour policies 
at national and at firm-level were also introduced (cf. Fazekas–Köllő, 1985). 
The public works programme widened after the 2008 crisis is, thus, not a sig-
nificantly new phenomenon, and its explanation cannot be limited to shifts of 
ideologies or economic policy ideas of current governments or political elites.
The current public works programme as a public policy goes hand in hand 
with workfare policies of West European and North American core countries, 
introduced in the past decades. How these policies reproduce socio-spatial 
inequalities has been at the forefront of critical labour and political-econo-
my studies since the 1990s. The following paragraphs summarise how and 
why workfare policies reproduce socio-spatial inequalities, as it is an inherent 
characteristic of them, and how the inequalities might be conceived as a re-
sult of inter-related economic processes at different geographical scales, from 
the local to the global (cf. Peck, 2002).
The transition from welfare to workfare is often described in an over-sim-
plified way as a neo-liberal economic shift towards the hollowing-out of the 
state. This term means that both the national and the local state (in Hun-
gary the more than 3200 municipalities) are losing power and their role in 
governing labour market processes. It might be self-evident from this per-
spective that social inequalities rise because of market processes – resulting 
in opportunities depending very much on where one lives. Employment op-
portunities differ, both as a consequence of variegated individual strategies 
in securing livelihoods, and the development trajectories of the local govern-
ment. This latter means, for example, that some municipalities are better off 
in attracting firms and capital for job creation, and thus from the rising local 
taxes more money might be re-distributed as social benefits. In spite of these 
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processes, local governments are taking different positions in the competi-
tion for national or supra-national financial transfers, such as development 
funds (see, inter alia, Kálmán, 2012). Following that, one cannot simply say 
that the state is losing power under the political-economic formation of ne-
oliberal capitalism, rather, the state both rolls out from, and rolls back into, 
certain realms of production of goods and services and social reproduction 
(Peck–Tickell, 2002).
From the 1970s on (following the economic downturn) ‘First World’ coun-
tries observed a triple transformation of the state, public works programmes 
being an integral part. Firstly, the Fordist mode of production declined, tra-
ditional wage relations having been substituted by deregulated, flexible forms 
of employment. (Flexibilisation is also typical for Hungarian – and more 
generally, for Eastern European countries’ – labour policies since the 1990s, 
irrespective of which parties were in power.) Secondly, parallel to the change 
in the mode of production, workfare states replaced former welfare states; 
dismantling the collective rights of social assistance, and introducing the 
obligation to work (for a current overview of the Hungarian case, see Cseres-
Gergely–Molnár, 2014). Thirdly, the penal apparatus of the state is widening, 
in a sphere where it is still possible (Wacquant, 2008). In Hungary, the pu-
nitive state and the public works programme is closely intertwined ideologi-
cally: for most of the public works programme the Ministry of the Interior 
is responsible (and not the Ministry for National Economy which oversees 
labour market policies in general).
The shift from the welfare state to the workfare state does not only transform 
the national scale. Overall, it might be conceived as a shift from a Keynes-
ian welfare national state to a Schumpeterian workfare post-national regime 
(Drahokoupil, 2007, MacLeavy, 2010). In Hungary, the upsurge in public 
works employment is a complex structural change in public administration, 
affecting different scales of governance. For instance, the supra-national EU 
scale (from which financial transfers arrive in ‘less-developed’ countries and 
regions – cf. Lendvai, 2008) played an indispensable role in financing the 
public works programme shortly after the outbreak of the 2008 economic 
crisis (Elek–Scharle, 2011). The scale of the national and the local state will 
be analysed in detail in the following parts of this chapter.
Economic crises have always been played out unevenly geographically (cf. 
Fazekas, 1996, Lőcsei, 2011, Boros–Pál, 2011), and thus employment policies 
tackling crises have also led to spatially uneven outcomes: their direct effect is 
smaller in areas where the primary labour market and traditional wage labour 
play a larger role (Czirfusz, 2014). Declining manufacturing regions are typi-
cally locations in which the national state launches national programmes in 
order to attract investments which also boost employment (for a comparable 
Czech example see Drahokoupil, 2007). In other cases the state becomes the 
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direct employer, such as in the Hungarian public works scheme. In addition, 
inequality might also be analysed within localities: in larger settlements un-
employment is concentrated in specific neighbourhoods (such as in quarters 
dominated by the working class or lower social classes in general). The local 
state reacts to spatial unevenness through the use of different local policies: for 
instance, Budapest’s 23 autonomous district municipalities introduced highly 
different social policies in spring 2015. A further aspect to be considered in 
this differentiation is the combination of the public works programme with 
punitive policies (Wacquant, 2008). Seemingly this move decreases social in-
equalities, but in reality these policies reproduce intra-urban tensions. The pub-
lic works programme fossilizes masses of people as the working poor – a pri-
marily urban problematic situation throughout Eastern Europe (Smith, 2008).
In some countries, spatial unevenness of employment has led to overtly spa-
tially focused policies. This has been the case in the United States in which 
welfare assistance was decentralised to the 50 states by the Clinton admin-
istration, or in the policies of the Labour governments in the United King-
dom after 1997 (Peck–Theodore, 2000). The aim of these policies is that they 
decentralise decision-making and financial resources (for example access to 
some funds are only available in designated ‘backward’ areas), and local needs 
are taken into account with spatially variegated development policies. Also 
important from a historical point of view, is that in the era of the neoliberal 
mode of regulation (since the 1970s in the Western world) local governments 
are able to show an increase of competencies, and are able to re-legitimise their 
jurisdiction by governing the realm of employment and unemployment locally 
(MacLeavy, 2008). This is a somewhat unique turn as the general public and 
the political discourse is about the growing constraints of local policy-making.
Despite these advantages, the disadvantages of the decentralisation of labour 
market policies are also visible. Rescaling responsibilities from the national 
level to the sub-national means growing competition for financial resources 
among regional and local governments. Rescaling is not a structural answer 
for the uneven development and is not an alternative to neoliberal economic 
policies (Crisp, 2012). In line with this argument, Peck and Theodore (2000), 
as well as Artner (2015) point out that workfare policies and welfare reforms 
are both part of the economic policies aiming to increase competitiveness 
– i.e. flexible, deregulated labour markets and public works programmes are 
two sides of the same coin, functionally complementing each other. What 
follows from this statement is – as shown in the following parts of the chap-
ter – that a public works programme is inherently unable to decrease spatial 
inequalities – as it does not deal with structural causes of unevenness, i.e. 
capitalist development. What is more, in local labour markets where the pri-
marily labour market is weak the public works scheme does not offer a solu-
tion for different groups of unemployed people according to educational at-
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tainment or other social dimensions. Public works programme participants 
are expelled from the primary labour market and forced into low-wage and 
low-skilled workplaces (in the Hungarian case, public works employees get 
less than the minimum wage).
In the Hungarian version of the public works scheme the roles and respon-
sibilities of the different scales brought about new hierarchies within public 
administration. The main regulatory changes have been discussed in Chap-
ter 2.1 of this book. Without repetition this chapter discusses how roles and 
power relations have been established between different spatial scales.
The public works scheme in Hungary is a national programme, directed by 
the minister responsible for public works,1 who decides upon the allocation of 
the appropriation secured by the yearly state budgets. The planning is carried 
out jointly with the sub-national level institutions: the 20 government offices 
of 19 counties and the capital city of Budapest (Figure 2.7.1), as well as the 
government offices in 174 districts.2 Spending the allocated funds is decided 
by the same government offices,3 according to municipal and other employers’ 
requests examined by the minister or the government office itself. Organis-
ing and the implementation of the public works at the local level are in the 
hands of the almost 3,200 municipalities.4 Co-ordinating the public works 
scheme, its communication and compiling the requests for funding is dealt 
with by the district’s government offices, as well as directly by the ministry.5
1 In some cases jointly with the 
minister responsible for employ-
ment policy – Act IV of 1991
2 Government decree 320 
of 2014, § 8. In Hungary, the 
counties (NUTS 3 level – see 
Figure 2.7.1) have limited power, 
but possess an elected county 
council. They also seat govern-
ment offices which are bodies 
of the executive authority at 
the sub-national level. The 174 
districts (NUTS 4 level) serve 
mostly administrative purposes.
3 Government decree 320 of 
2014, § 8. and government de-
cree 375 of 2010, § 7.
4 Act CLXXXIX of 2011, § 13 
and 15.
5 Government decree 320 of 
2014, § 11; Government decree 
66 of 2015, § 15.
Figure 2.7.1: Counties of Hungary
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Spatial allocation of the budget available for the public works scheme might 
be based on two principles. The first one is the equal access to enter the pro-
gramme which means that every unemployed person has equal rights and 
an equal chance to get a job under the scheme. This principle is important 
for the individual citizens, as availability of some of the social benefits is 
currently dependent on the fact of whether the person in need has taken 
part in the public works programme (this illustrates quite well that a work-
fare state is in formation in contemporary Hungary). The other principle 
which might be considered by policy-makers is prioritizing ‘ backward’ re-
gions with more available funding. In the yearly allocation of financial re-
sources characteristics of the regional and the local labour market have to 
be taken into account, and municipalities and areas might be designated 
as prioritized ones ‘in order to tackle social tensions and to offer a broad 
spectrum of public works’.6 However, how concretely this consideration is 
actually taking place is not detailed in the legislative documents. As a re-
sult, funding of the programme is assumed to be distributed unevenly be-
cause of two factors: Firstly, municipalities’ requests for public works quotas 
do not correlate with the number of unemployed people or with the social 
needs existing (some local municipalities do not organise public works at 
all). Secondly, the consideration as such at the regional or ministry level 
(vis-à-vis a normative allocation of funding) also opens up the possibility 
of bargaining and lobbying. The spatially uneven distribution of the budget 
and quotas of employment in the public works scheme is the topic of the 
following parts of this chapter.
Data
This chapter builds on official registry-based data on public works programme 
participants between 2011 and 2013. The data harmonised by the Databank 
of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences was complemented by other municipal-level (in Budapest: district-
level) datasets of the Regional Development and Spatial Planning Informa-
tion System (Országos Területfejlesztési és Területrendezési Információs 
Rendszer, TeIR) concerning the population number and the number of un-
employed.
Methodologically the main challenge in analysing the spatiality of pub-
lic works is to locate the public works programme episodes geographically. 
Participants of the programme are registered according to their permanent 
place of residence (coded by the postcode).7 The place of residence does not 
necessarily coincide with the actual place of work or the headquarters of the 
employer (this latter is the case for example at such employers as national 
forestry companies, national park or water management directorates cover-
ing larger areas).
6 Government decree 375 of 
2010, § 7/A. See also the govern-
ment resolution 1,044 of 2013.
7 The database contains 117.6 
million rows which describe 
one day of a public works par-
ticipant. Among those episodes 
the postcodes of permanent ad-
dresses were missing in 3,800 
cases which were not included 
in this study. The verification 
of the database (sorting out 
mistypings, etc.) was not pos-
sible. All in all these constraints 
are not considered as significant, 
and do not modify the main ten-
dencies to be described.
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The database registers postcodes of employed persons and this is used for 
aggregating data to the scale of municipalities. If several postcodes are used 
in one municipality, data was aggregated to the municipal level.8 As in some 
cases the same postcode is used in separate municipalities, several (adminis-
tratively independent) municipalities were pulled together in order to ensure 
compatibility with other databases containing the number of inhabitants and 
unemployed.9 In the case of Budapest, if possible, the district10 was used as an 
analytical unit. In the end, the database consisted of 2,613 aggregated units. 
In the following parts of the chapter, these will be referred to as municipali-
ties. The number of participants in the public works scheme was calculated 
by using the full-time-equivalent, in order to sort out the statistical effect of 
part-time work (cf. Cseres-Gergely–Molnár 2014).
Spatial inequalities of the public works scheme
Following the literature review of the preceding parts, it might be assumed 
that the spatial allocation of the public works in Hungary is highly uneven. 
In order to verify this assumption, the spatial distribution of the public works 
employment and unemployment was compared (Figure 2.7.2).
The two maps show 2013 municipal level data, the size of the circles is pro-
portional to the number of public works employment and that of the unem-
ployed persons, respectively. As other chapters in this book have demonstrated, 
after the reorganization of the public works scheme in 2011, 2013 featured a 
mostly solidified structure in terms of programme instruments and legislative 
background. Still, it is clearly visible from the comparison of the two maps 
that public works are not evenly distributed. More financial resources have 
been allocated to the Eastern parts of Hungary, but disproportionally more 
if the unemployment figures are taken into account. (It is clear that the pub-
lic works scheme contributed to the fact that the number of unemployed in 
these Eastern counties of Hungary11 is not as high compared to the Western 
parts of the country as it would be without the programme.) The fact that 
the distribution is highly uneven might be justified with county-level aggre-
gated data. 17.4% of full-time-equivalent public works employment is con-
centrated in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county (compared to an 11.7% share of 
the unemployed persons), a further 14.7% was allocated to Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg county (with 11% of the unemployed), followed by Hajdú-Bihar county 
(8.6%), Békés (7.3%), Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok (7.2%) and Baranya (7%). In Bu-
8 For example, four-digit post-
codes 2241 and 2242 both refer 
to the municipality of Sülysáp, 
data of the two postcodes was 
combined.
9 For example, postcode 7400 is 
used in the county seat Kapos-
vár, as well as two neighbouring 
municipalities. Postcodes 7451 
and 7461 denote two (formerly 
independent) neighbourhoods 
of Kaposvár. The three post-
codes were combined, as well 
as other statistical data of Ka-
posvár and the two other mu-
nicipalities. As a result, the least 
common multiple of different 
databases was secured.
10 Budapest has a two-tier ad-
ministrative system, responsi-
bilities are shared between the 
Budapest municipal govern-
ment and the governments of 
the 23 independent districts. 
As most of the social policies 
are delegated to the district 
governments in the city, and 
these social policies are highly 
different district-by-district, it 
is more meaningful to analyse 
those than the aggregated data 
of Budapest. (Budapest dis tricts 
are not to be confused with 
Hungary’s 174 sub-national 
districts – the administrative 
units referred to earlier.)
11 The most visible (and the most cited) differences within the 
county in terms of economic development is the East–West slope, 
apart from the Budapest–countryside divide. Western counties 
are often depicted as developed ones whose ‘winner’ economies 
are deeply integrated into global production networks (mostly in 
the manufacturing sector). The Northeast is characterised by an 
industrial decline starting during the 1970s global economic crisis 
and by a collapsing industry following the end of state socialism 
in 1989. Remaining parts of the East show a higher percentage 
of agricultural production, although most of the municipalities 
with several tens of thousands of inhabitants also have some 
companies in the manufacturing sector being in superior posi-
tions in global commodity chains. In the public discourse, social 
problems and tensions are often conceived as prevailing mostly 
in the easternmost counties, such as Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg.
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dapest 8.8% of the unemployment is concentrated, but the capital city only 
received 1.9% of the public works employment. The differences between the 
counties increased slightly between 2011 and 2013, primarily because of the 
growing share of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén.12
Figure 2.7.2: Full-time-equivalent person-days of public works employment (above) 
and the number of unemployed persons (below) at the municipal level (2013)
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
The map also reveals that county-level data obliterates considerable intra-county 
differences. It is striking that the allocation of funding within the counties of-
ten coincides with the assumed labour market position of the areas in the pub-
12 For the geographical location 
of counties referred to in this 
chapter, see Figure 2.7.1.
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lic discourse and in the national media. The Southern part of Baranya county 
at the Croatian border is a disadvantaged area with complex social problems 
emerging in the past 25 years of capitalism, and it also received significantly 
higher public works employment quotas than other parts also affected by un-
employment. Several stigmatized regions in the national public discourse which 
are often depicted as areas in which people are not working, lazy, or even wel-
fare scroungers – such as the former industrial centre of Ózd and its vicinity 
(Northwestern part of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county), or the middle part of 
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok county – received higher proportions of public works 
employment, seemingly with the intention to discipline those regions.
It is also obvious from the comparison of the two maps that on the map 
below, larger cities with higher numbers of unemployment do not stand out 
from the upper map showing public works employment. Larger municipali-
ties with larger (absolute) unemployment receive relatively smaller quotas of 
public works employment, or to put it differently, people living in larger set-
tlements have a significantly lower chance of entering into the programme 
once they become unemployed. This tendency is also shown on Figure 2.7.3 
which compares the distribution of public works employment, unemployment 
and population according to settlement size categories.
Figure 2.7.3: Distribution of public works employment (full-time-equivalent person-
days), unemployment and population according to settlement size categories 
(2013)
* Population: 1.7 million.
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
The public works employment scheme is primarily a programme running in 
smaller municipalities. The divide lies at settlements around 10 thousand 
inhabitants – in smaller municipalities than that unemployment is higher 
than in larger municipalities and this is not compensated for by a larger par-
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ticipation in the public works scheme. The situation in cities above 50 thou-
sand inhabitants is most striking: unemployment is present, but public work 
employment opportunities are scarce. Further qualitative studies are needed 
to find out whether the legislative environment (the responsibilities of the 
different scales of public administration) or the local government’s manage-
ment capacities limit the available public works in this category. For example, 
it might be assumed that large municipalities have neither personal resourc-
es, nor infrastructure, nor organisational knowledge of how to offer public 
works for several hundreds or thousands of unemployed people – the result 
being that these settlements do not apply for large quotas. The case of Bu-
dapest is unique in the sense that firstly, both the 23 districts and the city of 
Budapest offer public works employment, and secondly, the unemployment 
rate is rather low as there are more opportunities of waged labour on the pri-
mary labour market. It is also clear that in Budapest individual portfolios of 
securing livelihoods might be more diverse than in smaller settlements (cf. 
Smith–Stenning–Rochovská–Świątek, 2008). Despite these circumstances 
it is obvious that the public works scheme does not offer a viable policy solu-
tion for offering a large number of jobs for unemployed people in Budapest.
A larger scale public works programme has been organised and executed 
by the local governments since 2001. Unevenness of this public policy meas-
ure is not a new phenomenon emerging after the 2011 relaunch, but it is 
certainly true that broadening the programme in 2009 resulted in growing 
inequalities among municipalities (Keller–Bódis, 2012). These inequalities 
might be analysed in a breakdown according to different instruments of the 
programme. Full-time-equivalent person-days combined in public works em-
ployment were 19.7 million in 2011, 39.4 million in 2012 and rose to 46.8 
million in 2013. The shares of different instruments have constantly changed 
during the three years: the short-term public works, the so-called value-pro-
ducing public works and the wage subsidies offered to companies employing 
public workers were all ended in 2011. So-called Start model programmes 
were launched in 2013 (Table 2.7.1).
Different instruments of the programme contribute differently to change 
employment locally. In the following we analyse whether the person-days 
of public works employment correspond to the principle that counties and 
municipalities with higher unemployment should receive more funding and 
more public works quotas. To measure this question the distributions of pub-
lic works employment and unemployment between municipalities were com-
pared using the widely used inequality measure, the Hoover index.13 If the 
distribution of public works employees and that of unemployed persons is 
similar (i.e. the Hoover index is small and decreasing) then the programme 
reduces spatial inequalities of unemployment.14 Calculations were made both 
for the whole country (to measure the inequalities within the country), as 
13 Hoover index (H) measures 
the deviations of two distribu-
tions (xi, f i): 
             
The range of the index is be-
tween 0 and 100%; the higher 
the index value, the higher is the 
difference of the two distribu-
tions. The measure also shows 
what percentage of one distri-
bution has to be re-distributed 
throughout municipalities in 
order to achieve the same distri-
bution as that of the other one.
14 There is a methodological 
problem, of course, inasmuch 
as public works employment and 
unemployment are in a complex 
causal relation. Growing public 
works employment decreases 
unemployment. If the distri-
bution principles of quotas are 
followed, this decrease in unem-
ployment also leads to decreas-
ing public works employment.
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well as for the counties. This latter might refer to the role of government of-
fices at the county level in distributing public works employment within the 
counties. Results are shown in Table 2.7.2.
Table 2.7.1: Distribution of full-time-equivalent person-days among  
public works employment instruments (%)
Instrument 2011 2012 2013
Short-term public works 37.47 0.10 0.00
Long-term public works 26.46 64.97 28.42
Wage subsidies for companies 3.05 0.00 0.00
National programme 28.48 35.03 21.04
Value-producing public works 4.55 0.00 0.00
Start model programmes 0.00 0.00 50.64
Altogether 100.00 100.00 100.00
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences.
Table 2.7.2: County level inequalities of public works employment  
and unemployment, according to the instruments (Hoover indices, %, 2011–2013)
County
2011
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Short-term 
public 
works
Long-term 
public 
works
Wage subsi-
dies for 
companies
National 
programme
Value-
producing 
public 
works
Budapest 16.3 18.5 19.6 31.3 43.7 73.9
Baranya 28.4 18.6 30.5 47.7 57.5 72.0
Bács-Kiskun 16.3 14.7 20.3 60.3 35.1 94.2
Békés 16.6 13.4 16.0 52.2 34.9 68.0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 20.8 16.6 19.8 34.9 52.5 73.2
Csongrád 25.1 18.7 21.1 57.1 35.2 79.0
Fejér 20.3 19.8 18.3 44.2 49.2 88.9
Győr-Moson-Sopron 25.8 21.5 23.7 55.4 50.6 60.3
Hajdú-Bihar 19.2 16.9 21.5 29.5 37.6 64.8
Heves 22.9 20.7 25.8 48.5 46.0 91.4
Komárom-Esztergom 17.7 18.0 18.8 45.6 31.3 75.9
Nógrád 11.5 12.2 19.9 38.9 37.3 79.2
Pest 28.9 25.1 26.1 59.2 47.2 81.5
Somogy 21.5 16.5 18.2 62.6 50.0 68.0
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 22.2 17.3 21.6 37.6 39.7 73.9
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 18.8 17.8 18.5 38.7 37.3 91.7
Tolna 24.8 17.9 20.2 55.9 45.1 60.0
Vas 25.4 19.2 20.0 48.2 48.7 77.5
Veszprém 20.7 22.1 20.7 41.3 47.1 87.0
Zala 25.2 20.0 16.0 47.9 54.5 93.9
Total Hungary 25.8 22.9 27.0 48.7 47.1 77.7
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County
2012 2013
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Long-term 
public 
works
National 
pro-
gramme
Public 
works 
employ-
ment total
Long-term 
public 
works
National 
pro-
gramme
Start 
model 
pro-
grammes
Budapest 12.6 12.4 17.5 11.1 10.4 22.3 22.9
Baranya 39.2 40.2 50.6 32.3 25.9 44.9 37.4
Bács-Kiskun 26.3 30.1 32.7 27.9 17.8 34.1 54.8
Békés 24.7 27.5 30.9 23.5 15.0 30.2 30.9
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén 27.6 29.4 38.4 33.1 23.3 41.5 40.4
Csongrád 27.5 33.5 27.0 23.6 17.2 24.4 42.7
Fejér 27.8 34.3 32.1 26.3 12.0 27.9 72.4
Győr-Moson-Sopron 29.3 34.6 35.3 29.4 25.4 35.3 88.8
Hajdú-Bihar 32.4 35.7 31.8 34.1 21.9 29.9 46.7
Heves 33.3 41.7 35.6 28.9 16.2 31.2 63.8
Komárom-Esztergom 18.8 17.6 24.4 22.4 13.3 25.3 84.3
Nógrád 26.0 33.1 39.0 29.9 25.1 36.1 50.0
Pest 32.7 27.0 43.0 26.7 20.9 40.9 80.4
Somogy 29.2 33.5 39.0 25.4 22.1 34.5 39.5
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg 27.4 28.8 35.0 26.3 19.7 31.2 35.6
Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 26.6 32.1 30.1 31.4 22.6 29.7 45.5
Tolna 31.3 38.2 33.1 37.3 22.6 33.5 66.3
Vas 30.2 37.7 34.3 30.5 27.4 32.2 85.2
Veszprém 28.4 34.8 33.2 31.0 25.7 34.9 83.4
Zala 35.5 39.8 41.9 35.1 17.7 38.0 73.6
Total Hungary 32.9 37.6 38.2 34.7 22.4 37.5 53.8
Note: Grey background of cells indicates instruments with higher inequalities than 
the total public works of the respective year. Public works employment was meas-
ured by full-time-equivalent person-days.
Data source: Databank of the Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungar-
ian Academy of Sciences; Regional Development and Spatial Planning Information 
System.
Let us commence the analysis of the table with the yearly totals. It has al-
ready been shown that the distribution of the financial resources was highly 
uneven between municipalities in 2013. As the value of the Hoover index 
rose constantly between 2011 and 2013 (from 25.8 to 34.7 per cent), the pro-
gramme was less and less successful in channelling public money to munici-
palities with higher unemployment – despite the successive reforms of the in-
struments and the changing legislation regarding the implementation of the 
programme. The Hoover index of 34.7 per cent means that out of 10 person-
days in the country 3.5 were to be located elsewhere in order to concentrate 
resources into municipalities with higher unemployment. There have been 
large differences between specific instruments of the programme regarding 
the unevenness of their spatial distribution. The national programme (cover-
ing one-fifth to one-third of the person-days) was expected to fulfil the prem-
ise of even distribution (as it is co-ordinated at the national level, knowing 
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the socio-spatial trends of the whole country), but in fact, it has been more 
unevenly distributed than the total number of the public works employment 
(the Hoover index of the instrument exceeds that of the total).
Some of the instruments cancelled at the end of 2011 – such as the short-
term programme – were allocated broadly evenly, in concordance with the 
spatial distribution of unemployment. Despite the even allocation, the in-
strument itself was not able to help those people in need in securing liveli-
hoods, as it only offered employment for a very short period of time (Cseres-
Gergely–Molnár, 2014).
Wage subsidies paid for companies employing public workers, and the so-
called value-producing public works (the latter including municipal pro-
grammes) mobilised a small number of people (Table 2.7.1). Their spatial in-
equalities were high – in the case of the latter out of 10 person-days 8 were not 
in municipalities facing higher unemployment (Table 2.7.2). From this perspec-
tive, ceasing these instruments at the end of 2011 was a meaningful decision.
Long-term public works employment quotas differed significantly from year-
to-year. For 2013, however (perhaps because of a more thoughtful planning 
of the instrument) a spatial distribution was found which resembled spatial 
patterns of unemployment. Further qualitative research is needed for figur-
ing out whether the county and district government offices have played a role 
in this quite successful allocation of the financial resources.
Start model programmes were launched in designated ‘backward’ areas of 
the country in 2013. Although according to its name it is a model programme, 
its share became rather large in 2013, representing half of the total public 
works programme. The allocation of the financial resources is highly uneven 
(see the high Hoover index value). The cause of this unevenness might be that 
municipalities suffering from the most complex social problems have neither 
the organisational capacity, nor a viable agenda on how to tackle (mostly 
long-term) unemployment in their jurisdiction, thereby they were not apply-
ing for these financial resources. What follows then is that this instrument 
is biased towards municipalities which are more entrepreneurial (cf. Harvey, 
1989) than others; not eliminating the uneven geographical development of 
capitalism, but actually reproducing it.
Looking at county-level data it becomes obvious that even within counties 
public works employment is not concentrated to municipalities in which un-
employment is higher. In 2013 out of 10 person-days 2–4 (Komárom-Esz-
tergom 2.24, Tolna 3.73) go to settlements non justifiably if we make a com-
parison with the actual unemployment numbers. There are only a few cases 
in which the distribution of the financial resources have become (slightly) 
better – such as in Csongrád county. The same is true for Budapest and the 
surrounding Pest county, in which low and decreasing public works employ-
ment have become more even (but the total number of public works partici-
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pants is minimal compared to the number of unemployed). In some counties 
the spatial unevenness of the allocation has drastically increased, such as in 
Nógrád (11.5% to 29.9% between 2011 and 2013) – 3 out of 10 person-days 
were to be allocated elsewhere if a distribution fitting to the unemployment 
were to be considered. Among ‘winner’ counties of the programme (those 
with relatively high resources) it is only Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg in which the 
unevenness of the person-days did not increase – contrary to the situation in 
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén or Hajdú-Bihar.
Speaking of the specific instruments, the value-producing scheme and com-
panies’ wage subsidies were allocated by considerations of low efficiency. The 
short-term public works instrument was directed to settlements more in need 
in 2011 in a majority of counties, the long-term employment programme dis-
tribution, however, was rather uneven. In 2012 two instruments compensated 
for each other, except for four counties and Budapest. In 2013, Start model 
programmes were introduced. However, there was not a single county in Hun-
gary in which funding was primarily allocated to settlements with higher un-
employment. Apart from Budapest, 3–9 out of 10 person-days were utilised 
in municipalities in which it was not duly justified by unemployment figures. 
Long-term public works instrument runs smoothly, and unevenness has sig-
nificantly decreased in the counties (inequalities are the highest in Vas county 
with a Hoover index value of 27.4%). The co-ordination of the national pro-
gramme has led to a rather uneven spatial allocation – both among counties 
and within counties.
In sum, public works employment is unevenly distributed among counties, 
districts and settlements. One might conclude that this policy measure is un-
able to decrease unemployment differences within Hungary. The legislative-
organisational environment involves sub-national level of governance in the 
implementation of the programme. It is clear, however, that these units of 
public administration have not been able to concentrate public works em-
ployment into settlements with the highest unemployment – thereby pub-
lic money is used for maintaining uneven geographical development in the 
country. More detailed analysis would be needed to discover whether this 
inequality is a consequence of deficiencies in the hierarchical, power-laden 
allocation mechanisms or ‘simply’ a management problem. The first expla-
nation might cover controversial causal relations: decentralisation might be 
the cause of uneven allocation of funding, but it might also represent a tool 
which would help in allocating the resources more evenly. The second expla-
nation might result from the fact that all counties and districts are fighting 
for more public works employment, thus interests at different scales of the 
public works governance leads to spatial inequalities.
One cannot fail to consider the scale of the individual either. Local social 
hierarchies are reproduced through the public works programme; the em-
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ployability criterion is decisive in establishing new tensions – in-line with 
current social policies making a distinction between deserving and undeserv-
ing poor. If unemployment exceeds the number of public works employment 
quotas (which is the case in most of the municipalities), it is the ‘employable’ 
people who get the jobs. Thereby, individual skills become more important 
in public policies than structural problems of the economy (cf. Peck–Theodore, 
2000), reproducing neoliberal capitalism on the individual, the local and the 
national scale. Entrance and exit chances in relation to the programme are 
highly differentiated (Cseres-Gergely–Molnár, 2014) and social inequalities 
are reproduced. These trends are covered in other chapters of In focus in detail.
Conclusion
Public works employment broadened at the culmination of the 2008 crisis, 
and re-shaped in 2011, reproducing socio-spatial inequalities of labour. Public 
works employment is, however, not a single public policy intervention which 
might be analysed independently from other labour market policies (such 
as flexibilisation of the labour force) or social policies (shift from welfare to 
workfare). The public works programme is an important element in (and a 
symptom of) not only reproducing social inequalities, but also marginalis-
ing spaces and places. In spite of the legislation that resources should be con-
centrated on areas with more severe unemployment, data from 2011–2013 
shows that this goal was not achieved – in fact, the allocation of the financial 
resources has become spatially more uneven. One critical reason for this un-
evenness is the nature of the legislation which does not provide a clear struc-
ture concerning how to deconcentrate funding and employment numbers to 
counties and municipalities. How allocation proceeds directly at certain spa-
tial scales of public administration was not analysed in this paper; the main 
goal was to describe unevenness at different geographical scales. What fol-
lows from the analysis of the data is that public works employment seems to 
be a public policy tool in which public money is spent less efficiently. For ex-
ample, re-allocating money from the programme to provide unemployment 
benefits for a longer period of time would mean a more just allocation of the 
funding, probably also needing less administrative capacities. However, it is 
certainly clear that public works employment is ‘effective’ in several other re-
gards: in reproducing and increasing socio-spatial inequalities and effectively 
supporting subsequent governments’ class politics.
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